Marshall Pruett delves into INDYCAR's 49-page brief on the Las Vegas crash and details a number of interesting facts, findings and erroneous assumptions.
Marshall Pruett
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Posted December 15, 2011
9) In addition to generating a report on what took place with the accident itself, INDYCAR also provided findings and suggestions for future changes to the running of races on ovals.
Suitability of IndyCar Series Race Cars to High-Banked Ovals
INDYCAR assembled a technical committee to focus on the aerodynamic and mechanical considerations related to 1 ½ mile high-banked ovals. The first meeting occurred at 12:00 p.m. on November 18, 2011 at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway Pagoda. The chairman of the committee is Will Phillips, INDYCAR Vice President, Technology. The attendees are IndyCar Series team engineers. In an effort to be as inclusive as possible and take advantage of the collective knowledge in the paddock, the committee members will serve on a rotational basis. In addition, representatives from chassis automobile manufacturer Dallara were invited to attend.
INDYCAR has determined that it would not be appropriate to frame its analysis of the suitability of IndyCar Series race cars to high-banked ovals by looking at all tracks of this classification as a general category. In other words, each high-banked oval has unique characteristics, and each should be considered individually. INDYCAR and CART/Champ Car have successfully conducted numerous races over numerous years on courses that meet the definition of high-banked ovals.
Due in part to the geometry of the track , each track has its own unique routes around the circuit that optimize speed and handling capabilities. These routes are considered "racing grooves" and create restrictions on where a driver can place the race car on the track to remain competitive. Most tracks have limited numbers of racing grooves. For example, it is not unusual for ovals to have only one or 2 racing grooves, including the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. Racing grooves not only restrict drivers' naturally aggressive racing behavior but make the location of other competitors' cars on the race track predictable.
The geometry of the track also requires adjustments to the race car to achieve effective and safer competition. This is commonly referred to as the "race car set up " and is typically different at each race track. INDYCAR dictates the parameters for the race car set up at each event. Within those parameters, teams attempt to achieve set ups that give their drivers more or expanded racing groove options.
Examination of the video of the October 16th event demonstrates normal “pack racing” that is common of high-banked ovals. However, what was also witnessed was nearly unlimited movement on the track surface under race conditions. This capability of relative free movement on the track without the restraints of natural racing grooves must be attributed to track geometry beyond banking. Whatever the reason, the combination of track geometry factors allowed for relatively unrestricted movement within the racing pack not previously experienced. This movement not only allowed for increased probability for car to car contact but made it more difficult for drivers to predict the movement of other drivers. As a result, the opportunity for this incident was increased. While this incident could have occurred at any track at any time, the dynamic of the current car and the overall track geometry at Las Vegas Motor Speedway under race conditions appears to have been causal to this incident.
In 2012, the IndyCar Series introduces a new car design, and INDYCAR has concluded that prior to racing at Las Vegas Motor Speedway, further testing is appropriate to evaluate the dynamic between the new race car and the specific geometry of this track.
Determination of Starting Field Size for Specific Tracks
As previously noted above, starting field size is determined based upon a number of factors such as length and width of the race track, travel considerations, pit space capability, and tradition (such as the 33 car field at Indianapolis). Based upon these factors, it was decided that Las Vegas Motor Speedway could accommodate a 34 car starting field. The actual occurrence of the October 16th incident by itself does not change this conclusion. This incident and the consequences could have occurred with any size starting field at any track. However, the previously discussed experience with freedom of movement during the race does create questions of whether an INDYCAR starting field of any size is appropriate in the future. This will be a topic for further review and investigation based upon the 2012 car dynamics.
Effect of Promotion
While the INDYCAR Challenge rules required Dan's car to start at the rear of the race field, almost every IndyCar Series event has one or more participants who either qualified higher or who were capable of qualifying higher that start at the rear of the racing field due to qualification difficulties, penalties, or the commonly made decision of their team to make material changes to their race car after qualifications. No conduct by Dan Wheldon's driving of car #77 during the course of the race including lap 11 was found to have contributed to the cause of the racing incident or its consequences. Furthermore, no conduct by any drivers on lap 11 was found to be inconsistent with expected driving during the race. The initial contact was consistent with racing and the chain of events that followed was the result of chance interactions. The promotion was not causal to the incident.
Preferred Fencing Configuration for Tracks Hosting INDYCAR Events
The Las Vegas Motor Speedway fencing is typical of many race tracks and consists of 4- 4.5 inch diameter poles mounted and secured to the backside of the wall and properly anchored. The fence is then created by cables attached to the trackside of the poles and fence fabric to the outside. The fencing is approximately 14 feet high.
The fencing (including post, cables and fabric) at the Las Vegas Motor Speedway was found to have performed to all expectation in retaining a race car from leaving the track. The only change that would be preferred is for the fence fabric to be on the track side of the post rather its current configuration. While there is no evidence that placement of the fabric would have changed the consequences of this accident, there are accident scenarios that can be envisioned in which the fabric placement might have some significance. For that reason, the preferred fabric placement at any track hosting an INDYCAR event is on the trackside of the fence post.
While there has been a continuous focus on attempting to prevent race cars from making contact with track spectator fencing, it has continued and will continue to occur in every type of racing. INDYCAR recognizes that the positioning of a race car into the fencing is a matter of chance, and the position of the race car's entry into the fence is very material to the consequence of driver injury. The number of possible race car entry positions is infinite. In the case of this accident, the contact between car #77 and the fence allowed for the exact alignment of fence post entry into the driver cockpit. This accident and its consequences is another reminder of the risk associated with racing regardless of efforts to make it safer.
Equipment/Car Performance in the Accident
The race car being driven at the Las Vegas Motor Speedway has evolved into a race vehicle with an unmatched safety record in open wheel racing. The experience of this race car in serious accidents and with its drivers being able to avoid serious injury made Dan's death even more shocking. While the new race car design is expected to continue the safety and performance evolution, there was nothing found in the performance of any of the race cars participating that was a factor in causing this racing incident.
The only mechanical issue raised as to the race cars was by some drivers who had the belief that pull back brakes may have been utilized on some race cars. While there is no evidence that lack of braking caused the accident or contributed to Dan's unsurvivable injury, the belief that pull back brakes were being used was investigated.
Pull back brakes are prohibited by the IndyCar Series rules and involve altering the position of the brake pads in a way that reduces pad contact to reduce friction on the wheel but at the cost of making the braking slightly less effective. While placement and nature of the alteration make enforcement of the rule against pull back brakes very difficult, the technical committee wants to look for better ways to enforce the existing rule or otherwise discourage their use. It is noted that pull back brakes tend to be a qualifying issue and not one that would be expected to exist in the race itself. However, with the report of driver concern as to the use of pull back brakes, specific attention was given to this issue.
("Pull back brakes" is the common term for use of a device designed to push or pull back caliper pistons. Pull back brakes are prohibited by Rule 14.10(A)(2).)
On-board data acquisition system information was used to investigate the issue. With the cooperation of the teams, INDYCAR collected the on-board data acquisition system of 12 of the 15 race cars involved. This on-board data acquisition system would be expected to show reduced braking capacity if pull back brakes existed. The on-board data acquisition system of the #77 race car showed that the front brakes performed as expected but showed minimal braking response by the rear brakes at the time of the accident. While it would be unusual to use pull back brakes in the rear but not the front, it is not possible to fully eliminate the possibility of front pull back brakes as well. The braking actions of the driver could have overcome the effect of front pull back brakes and masked the result in the on-board data acquisition system. However the effective speed reduction shown by #77 indicates that the braking was effective and is inconsistent with the use of pull back brakes or the more serious condition of brake failure. While this on-board data acquisition finding could be an indication of sensor failure, the sensors on the #77 appears to be fully functional during the warm up laps and the first 10 laps of racing. This suggests that the sensors were functional. Finally, the braking system of #77 was inspected in its damaged condition and did not show any evidence of pull back brakes. The on-board data acquisition finding on car number #77 brakes had no obvious cause. The team manager of #77 was consulted, and he has given assurances that pull back brakes were not utilized. He explained that the team had experienced similar on-board data acquisition findings on occasions prior to October 16th but as their driver was obtaining the braking level requested this was attributed by the team to their use of small caliper brakes.
Although INDYCAR has not established a basis for the on-board data acquisition finding, evidence as to braking response of the #77 reveals a reduction in speed consistent with other competitors; therefore, the braking system was not a causal factor in the accident.