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PRUETT: The Firing Of IndyCar CEO Randy Bernard, Part 2
Marshall Pruett concludes his analysis of Randy Bernard's firing.
Marshall Pruett  |  Posted November 01, 2012  

WHAT COULD HAVE SAVED RANDY?

As one driver told me this week, “If the TV ratings were up and the sponsorship levels went up with it, we wouldn’t be having this conversation about Randy.”

That’s another point I can’t argue. Prosperity tends to have a calming effect, and if the paddock was flush with cash, I’d like to say that some degree of increased peace would have been achieved.

I’m not foolish enough to think or opine that happiness would have swept over the series and all of its faults would have been overlooked, but most people wouldn’t try to fire a guy like Bernard if he was making them rich…or richer, in some cases.

As Bobby Rahal mentioned earlier, Bernard inherited a broken series. It was bleeding red and losing money at a frightful pace. He stemmed most of that bleeding and was said to be on pace to making IndyCar break even by the end of 2013, according to one businessman with knowledge of the series’ books, but it would have taken a lot more time to steer the series into the black.

Increased wealth would have gone a long way to add more paddock members to the “Team Randy” club, but knowing that any turnaround involving ratings and sponsorship would have been slow and gradual, Bernard’s most practical route to remaining employed would have come with hiring a Competition Director.

It has been said enough times already, but had Bernard been able to separate himself from the paddock via a surrogate—someone who handled the needs, concerns and wishes of his owners and drivers, I have no doubt he would have completed his five-year contract with the series.

Looking at the spare parts/costs situation, with a Competition Director, a Derrick Walker or similar, in place to handle those interactions, I’m convinced a different, more positive outcome would have been achieved. The paddock wanted one of their own to interact and negotiate with, but never got it.

The question that has been asked over and over again since Bernard started the job is why that Walker-esque person wasn’t hired.

Resumes were solicited. Interviews, no matter how informal, took place. And at least one of the candidates, someone who was perfect for the job, was keen to do it and ready to report for duty.

I’ve been told that money—a smallish annual budget to administer the series and pay for its employees—was what kept the position from being filled. I’ve also been told that the urgency to fill that role, despite it being a critical priority for the paddock, never reached that stop-everything-and-make-it-happen status many felt it required.

Whether it was strictly down to offering a smaller salary than the position required, a failure to escalate the need to hire someone to the Code Red level the paddock wanted, or a combination of the two, adding that layer of management would have made all the difference in Bernard’s ability to lead IndyCar through 2014.

HOW NOT TO HANDLE A CEO TRANSITION

With the paddock gradually divorcing itself from Bernard and the board’s intentions to replace him, how the board came to believe that scaring the living **** out of IndyCar fans on Sunday would quickly be forgotten is something worth exploring.

I often think of Indy car racing—spanning CART, Champ Car and the IndyCar Series—as a patient that has been in critical condition far too often.

Sure, there were extended periods where it was a picture of health, but for those who’ve followed the sport for the past 20 years or so, we’ve seen the patient dip in and out of the Intensive Care Unit at least three or four times.

In recent years, we’ve seen Champ Car flatline and the IndyCar Series soldier on, but we’ve also seen IndyCar land in the ICU a few years ago and, while it has made a solid recovery, the patient still has a ways to go.

With this in mind, Sunday’s shock announcement has, if we’re strictly talking about the public’s reaction, given the impression that IndyCar is back in the ICU once again and fighting for its life.

I recognize that finding a CEO isn’t an overnight exercise. I’m keenly aware that planning a transition for someone like Bernard who had such massive popularity among fans was never going to be easy, but failing to realize that a hasty firing would unsettle the sport in the manner that has played out was downright ridiculous.

For a series that made so many incredible strides in 2012, had so much going for it with new manufacturers, the oft mentioned great racing and an American champion to promote, safeguarding that goodwill by charting a smooth transition for Bernard was crucial.

The diehard “Randy Must Go” movement started in April. It came to light in May. It simmered from June through September just as the spare parts/owners group reached and remained at their boiling point.

The pleas for Bernard to be fired were first heard by the board back when Lotus still had five cars on the grid, for crissakes. It’s easy to make statements with the benefit of hindsight, but it didn’t take a rocket surgeon to suggest that hatching a CEO contingency plan would have been a good idea once the Indy 500 drew to a close.

How different would the world’s perception be on the state of the IndyCar Series if the board had quietly sought a new CEO, hired that CEO, and moved Bernard aside when that person what ready to be unveiled?

Granted, it would have been mostly PR spin, but had IMS sent out a release that said it was bringing on a more experienced, more connected CEO and was keeping Bernard on staff to oversee the series’ marketing and promotions—the one area most people saw as his greatest qualification, I’m convinced the messaging on Bernard’s new role would have been received in a much more positive light.

Keep in mind that for the majority of fans, Bernard’s lack of popularity within the series wasn’t known, but I’m sure that enough followers of the sport were aware that Bernard’s gift wasn’t in the hardcore aspects of running a racing series.

I’m positive that most fans, sponsors and manufacturers would still have had plenty of questions as to why a new CEO was installed. But being able to genuinely say that the board had brought in a CEO with even more skills while Bernard was being charged with growing the sport’s reach and popularity would have been a much easier pill to swallow.

Forward-looking...positive...we took our time, thought everything out and everything's under control.

Instead, we’ve been left with a massive information gap, fans angered and confused over Bernard’s firing and the sport looking like it’s gotten out the shovel and started digging its grave.

If the board had as much passion to properly handle the transition as it did to jettison Bernard without explanation, much of this PR disaster would have been averted.

One final note: I spoke with Jeff Belskus Thursday morning and he reiterated on three occasions that there was no rush to have a replacement CEO waiting in the wings because he intended to assume the position. IndyCar lost one CEO and gained another in an instant, so from a governance standpoint, there was no interruption.

Belskus asserted that he was the new IndyCar CEO whenever I mentioned the need to find an immediate replacement for Bernard, saying, “We do have a CEO in place. I’m not introducing myself as the ‘interim CEO’…”

Well, it’s a bit awkward to point out, but the IMS press release that announced Bernard’s change in job title also included this passage:

“Belskus, who served as CEO of INDYCAR from July 2009 through February 2010, will continue in his current roles in addition to being named interim CEO of INDYCAR.”

It could be nothing more than semantics, but by positioning Belskus as the interim CEO, it sent the message that the board was looking for a replacement and did not have one to unveil on Sunday.

It’s good that Belskus, who knows what the board wants more than any other executive at 16th & Georgetown, jumped in to take control. But the lasting impression that fans, the media and those in the sports entertainment industry were left with was that IndyCar had, for the umpteenth time, loaded up a pair of AK-47s and blasted away at its credibility.

Even if that impression was completely wrong…even if Belskus had everything under control at the series…it wasn’t the message that went out to the world.

PARNELLI’S LETTER

1963 Indy 500 winner Parnelli Jones gave me permission to publish the letter he and an associate sent to Jeff Belskus last Friday.

It has no real bearing on anything after the fact, nor did it achieve its intended purpose, but I thought it was worth including to show that for one of the 500’s most respected heroes, disposing of Bernard made no sense.

And if a legend like Parnelli Jones, someone who maintains strong ties with IMS and the IndyCar paddock, was confused about was happening to Bernard, what chance did IndyCar fans have of understanding his spur-of-the-moment firing?

October 26. 2012

Dear Jeff,

After all the rumors, innuendos and articles being published and disseminated regarding the alleged firing of Randy Bernard, we can no longer hold our peace.

We feel the false reports that seem to surface daily regarding Randy’s future are severely damaging the hard work and positive results (which are too numerous to mention here), which have been accomplished in the last eighteen months by Randy and his staff. Although we are obviously not privy to any financial aspects of Indy Car, from the outside looking in, Randy has done an exemplary job in bringing Indy Car and open wheel championship racing in general, back to the forefront, and is responsible for rebirth of the sport we hold so dear. There is old adage that reflects our thinking as well, which is; to be a really successful racing series, it cannot be managed by the car owners, most of whom vigorously support their own agenda, but must be run by a dictatorship with given power to rule fairly, but with an iron fist.

It probably goes without saying however, that the content of these reports we refer to certainly couldn’t please the current or potential sponsors, broadcast partners, parts vendors, most car owners, and above all, the fans. Yes, those fans who in the recent years, because of open wheel racing’s acrimonious past, shunned the series, and are now supporters. Why? Mostly because of Randy Bernard.

We feel that another day cannot go by before someone who has the power and authority, to unequivocally declare that Randy is not being fired, and the board has no intention of firing him, and further, can hold his current office as long as he wants. Should clear cut and positive support of Randy not be forthcoming immediately by the Indy Car’s powers that be, we are afraid the series will be in big trouble once more, and the hard earned respect and interest of the fans, will fade like dust in the wind.

Sincerely,

Parnelli Jones
Jimmy Dilamarter

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As Belskus also shared on Thursday, although Bernard has been rejected, his plans for 2013 are still in place. The schedule, the double-headers, and everything else Bernard had already put in motion, as far as we know, will be kept.

Understanding the full measure of what those plans and initiative are, however, is a bit of a mystery.

It won’t happen anytime soon, but the faster IndyCar can hold its annual State of the Series and spell out all of its plans, the better it will be for everyone involved.

I’m aware of many things Bernard was going to implement for 2013—most of them were smart or helpful, but they weren’t public knowledge. I’ll be interested to see which items break cover and which ones are tabled.

I won’t go too far into this topic here as it will be the subject of a feature next week, but with the need to hire a new CEO, IndyCar must also drag itself into modern times with a flat organizational chart for upper management.

If we’re going to break the fire-the-CEO-every-few-years cycle, IndyCar’s next boss will need four or five empowered VPs below him or her to spread the load.
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Marshall Pruett

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